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1. Introduction 
1.1 The minor beneficiary regime 
This working paper comprises a chapter of a book on the taxation 
of trusts that is scheduled to be published by Brooker’s, Wellington, 
New Zealand, in 2002, together with fragments from two other 
chapters. The draft chapter, section 3 of this paper, was written as a 
result of the passage of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of 
Minors, Services-Related Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 
2001, in particular the parts of that Act that relate to beneficiary 
income of minors. Section 2 of the paper discusses the meaning of 
“settlor” in the Income Tax Act. The terms “settlor” and 
“settlement” are of pivotal importance in the architecture of the 
minor beneficiary regime. Section 4 backgrounds the relationship 
between the trust regime in the Income Tax Act and the company 
tax imputation system and explains how the Act integrates 
imputation credits and the minor beneficiary regime. Because the 
paper is to become a chapter from a proposed book on the taxation 
of trusts in general it omits certain cross-references that will in due 
course appear in the book. Thus, for example, the paper does not 
attempt to explain some of its more abstruse references rules that 
apply to trusts with international connections. 
The need for rules relating to the taxation of beneficiary income 
of minors comes about as a result of a policy on the part of the New 
Zealand government to adopt a mildly progressive schedule of 
income tax rates in place of the former relatively flat scale. Since 
the 2000-2001 fiscal year the rates for individuals have progressed 
from 19.5 per cent for incomes up to $38,000, 33 per cent for 
incomes from $38,001 to $60,000, and 39 per cent for incomes over 
that sum. 
One consequence of this change was that it became much more 
worthwhile than in the past for parents to channel income to their 
children via trusts, with a view to that income being taxed at the 
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lower rates that children ordinarily enjoy, (since children generally 
have relatively low taxable incomes). 
1.2 Special rate for minors 
Parliament responded by enacting the Taxation (Beneficiary 
Income of Minors, Services-Related Payments and Remedial 
Matters) Act 2001, which taxes the income of most beneficiaries of 
trusts who are minors at 33 per cent. Logic might have suggested 
39 per cent, being the rate that most affected parents would 
otherwise have paid on income diverted to their children. 
Parliament chose 33 per cent mainly for reasons of administrative 
convenience, which are explained later in this paper.2 
The idea of taxing some income of children at a flat rate of 33 
per cent is deceptively simple. To fit such a policy into a modern 
income tax statute has been a remarkably complex operation. This 
working paper attempts an exegesis of the rules that were needed. 
The next paragraphs describe several of the structural features of 
the Income Tax Act 1994 that had to be taken into consideration 
and outlines the rules that Parliament enacted in response. 
1.3 Problems and solutions  
First, the Act does not impose particular rates of tax on particular 
dollars of the income of an individual. Instead, people add their 
total income and calculate the tax on that total. One can work out an 
average rate of tax on each dollar, or a marginal rate on the last 
dollar, but there is no provision for taxing income of a particular 
type at a particular rate. The Taxation (Beneficiary Income of 
Minors, Services-Related Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 
2001 overcomes this problem by, instead, taxing minor 
beneficiaries’ income to trustees, who do pay tax at a flat rate. 
                                         
2 §3.2, below. 
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Secondly, although the solution of taxing the income in question 
to trustees is effective, it contains its own problems. For instance, if 
the income in question is a dividend accompanied by an imputation 
credit, does the credit go to the trustee or to the beneficiary? This 
and other problems required their own rules.3 
Thirdly, broadly speaking the policy of the minor beneficiary 
regime is to prevent families from spreading the income of their 
primary earners to children who enjoy lower rates of tax. The 
policy is not to ratchet up the rates of tax on children’s income just 
because they derive it via trusts. As a result, there must be 
exceptions for income from testamentary trusts, from trusts 
established to hold compensation payments, and from a number of 
other sorts of trusts.4 In turn, there must be counter-exceptions to 
prevent families from taking a free ride by adding funds to such 
privileged trusts. The end result is a regime of considerable but 
inevitable complexity. 
1.4 Trust settlors as the connecting factor 
The problems of identifying income of minor beneficiaries that 
is to be taxed at 33 per cent, and then of ring-fencing beneficiaries’ 
income from trusts that is to be exempt from the regime, presented 
a challenge. The drafters opted to use the identity of settlors as the 
factor that would identify trust income as within or outside the 
regime. That decision meant defining “settlor” with some care, and 
required adding special rules to the definition that would operate 
within the context of the minor beneficiary regime. For this reason, 
this working paper begins by describing the settlor definition rules 
in the Income Tax Act. It uses some paragraphs from an earlier 
chapter of the proposed book, before embarking on the minor 
beneficiary regime proper. 
                                         
3 See §4.3. 
4 See §3.10 and §3.11 
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2. Settlors 
2.1 Policy 
Generally speaking, the identity of the settlor is not a factor in the 
taxation of a trust. Once property has been transferred the settlor 
drops out of the picture and the law taxes income produced by the 
property of the trust, either to the trustee or to the beneficiary. (The 
relevant rules are set out in the paragraphs that follow.) In respect 
of settlors the taxation of trusts largely reflects the legal position. 
That is, the identity of settlors is rarely important for purposes of 
trustee law, and broadly speaking taxation law takes the same 
approach. 
This general approach of taxation law ignores an important 
economic fact: that while a trustee is not in law the agent of either 
settlor or beneficiary, from an economic point of view trustees 
sometimes do act as the agents of their settlors. For instance, a 
settlor may transfer property to a trustee to divide the income and 
the corpus between the settlor’s grandchildren in due course. In 
principle the settlor could make the division personally, when the 
time comes. However, the settlor appoints a trustee to do the work, 
perhaps for fear of not living long enough, or perhaps for fear that 
creditors may otherwise attack the corpus. The short point is that 
although in law the settlor cannot direct the trustee, in an economic 
sense the trustee stands in the position of the settlor as the settlor’s 
agent.5 
In principle, New Zealand tax policy tries to follow economic 
considerations rather than legal form, but where there is a close 
parallel between economics and law the law tends to prevail for tax 
purposes. That approach is true of the taxation of trusts for the most 
part: as long as income is taxed either to the trustee or to the 
beneficiary fiscal policy is sufficiently satisfied. 
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There are two areas in New Zealand trust taxation law where 
Parliament is not satisfied that taxation by reference to beneficiary 
and trustee alone is sufficient. The first is where beneficiaries under 
sixteen years of age derive income from trusts established by 
relatives. The second is where foreign elements are involved.  In 
these areas the rules take into account the connection between the 
settlor and the trust or the beneficiary. They are discussed in the 
proposed book. 
2.2 Settlor: definition 
As explained above, where the identity of the settlor is relevant to 
the trust taxation rules the reasons relate to fiscal policy rather than 
to tax law. Reflecting this policy, section OB 1 of the Income Tax 
Act defines “settlor” in terms that relate to economic substance 
rather than to legal form. It is not important whether the trust deed 
names the person in question as the settlor. What matters is the 
transfer of value to the trust for less than arm’s length 
consideration. The section OB 1 definition may be summarised as 
follows, employing its subparagraph numbering. A person is a 
settlor who, for less than market value: 
q makes any disposition to the trust; 
q makes any property, including any loan or other financial 
assistance available to the trust; 
q provides any service to the trust; or 
q acquires anything from the trust at more than market value. 
Each subparagraph applies whether the transaction in question is 
direct or indirect and whether the transfer of value occurs by one 
transaction or by a series. Each transaction is a separate settlement. 
This rule means that if different people effect settlements on a 
single trust, for tax purposes there can be two or more settlors of 
the trust in question. 
The “financial assistance” paragraph contemplates financial 
assistance provided by (a) loan, (b) guarantee, (c) granting security, 
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or (d) “otherwise”. It would seem that “otherwise” includes 
assistance by granting credit for the price in the context of a sale. 
Another possibility is that trustees may borrow money on behalf 
of the trust for trust purposes from a third party. In these 
circumstances the trustees are personally liable for the debt unless 
there is provision to the contrary. It is common for the trust deed or 
for the loan contract to exclude trustees’ liability or to limit their 
liability to the assets of the trust. In the absence of such a provision 
the fact of trustees’ personal liability would seem to amount to 
“financial assistance” to the trust. Like granting credit on a sale, 
such assistance appears to be “otherwise” than by loan, by 
guarantee, or by the provision of security. The effect is much the 
same as a guarantee, but formally the trustee is the principal debtor. 
A third possibility is that someone, perhaps a trustee or perhaps a 
relative of a beneficiary, purchases something for the trust and 
waits some time for reimbursement. Here, too, the purchaser clearly 
has rendered “financial assistance” to the trust. The Commissioner 
takes the view that such help is correctly described as a “loan”.6 It is 
true that the transaction results in a debt from the trust to the 
purchaser, but it does not follow that there must have been a loan. 
The better view is that such financial help is financial assistance 
provided “otherwise” than by loan, guarantee, or security. 
Whether financial assistance falls under one of the three 
nominate heads of loan, guarantee, or security, or whether it falls 
under the omnibus “otherwise” has important practical 
consequences in respect of the application of the minor beneficiary 
regime, discussed later in this book.7 
The definition of “settlement” builds on the definition of 
“settlor, with the result that an action or omission that makes one a 
“settlor” is itself a “settlement”. 
                                         
6 Inland Revenue Department 13 Tax Information Bulletin (2001) issue 5, 31. 
7 §3.8 ff. 
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In parenthesis, subparagraph (ii) adds: 
… where financial assistance is provided to or for the 
trust [a] at below market rates or [b] amounts payable 
in relation to the financial assistance are payable on 
demand and the right to demand payment is not 
exercised or is deferred [then in either case] the 
financial assistance shall be deemed to have been 
provided to or for the benefit of the trust for less than 
market value.8 
Limb [a] of this parenthesis thus says that “below market rates” 
“shall be deemed to have been … for less than market value”. 
Examples might include loans or the provision of credit at low or 
no interest.  
A typical transaction to which limb [b] might apply is a sale on 
credit with a Marshall clause, that is a clause providing for the 
payment of interest if demanded. Marshall v CIR9 held that neither 
a Marshall clause itself nor the failure to demand interest pursuant 
to the clause amounted to a gift that was dutiable pursuant to the 
Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968. In contrast, limb [b] makes it clear 
that for Income Tax Act purposes a person becomes a settlor by 
extending credit to a trust and failing to demand interest or by 
deferring a demand for interest. 
Another example of the provision of financial assistance to a 
trust at below market value would seem to occur where the trustee 
borrows money for the trust with no exclusion of liability. If the 
trustee can work out what a market rate fee might be and if the 
trustee charges that fee then the transaction would escape being a 
settlement under paragraph (b)(ii) of the definition of “settlor”. 
                                         
8 Parenthetical items added. 
9 [1965] NZLR 851 CA. 
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The Act modifies some elements of this for purposes of the 
minor beneficiary regime.  Chapter 3 and §3.7 respectively discuss 
that regime and the modifications 
2.3 Settlor: anti-avoidance and nominees 
To add a belt to the several braces of subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of the 
“settlor” definition, subparagraph (v) is an anti-avoidance rule. It 
makes anyone a settlor 
who acts or abstains from acting or directly or 
indirectly enters into a transaction or a series of 
transactions with or in relation to the trust with the 
effect of defeating the intent and application of this 
definition. 
Section HH 1 of the Income Tax Act both extends and limits the 
general definition of “settlor” that is described above. First, section 
HH 1(1) excludes from the definition (a) anyone who acts as the 
nominee of someone else and (b) anyone who establishes a trust by 
making a nominal settlement at the request of another. Instead, the 
nominee’s principal or the person making the request is treated as 
the settlor. 
Treating the principal as settlor can have significant practical 
effects. It became common in New Zealand and in some other 
common law jurisdictions for people wishing to establish trusts to 
procure someone else to do it for them. Thus, a relative or one’s 
solicitor would establish a trust for one’s children with a donation 
of a small sum of money. Later (usually not much later) one would 
transfer wealth to the trust by sale or gift. The reason for the tactic 
of having a third party create the trust is that some tax or estate duty 
legislation identified settlors of trusts purely formally, by reference 
to the person named in the deed as settlor, (or the legislation was 
thought to operate in that manner). As a result, drafters of trusts 
tried to avoid making a contact between settlor and beneficiary by 
employing independent settlors. It was thought that having an 
independent settlor could avoid rules that might, for example, 
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attribute trust income to a parent who settles a trust for an infant 
beneficiary. 
Whatever the success of this kind of scheme at the time, theses 
days independent settlors should be used with caution. Where party 
A intends to confer a benefit on a trust there is no point in using an 
independent settlor because the definition of “settlor” discussed in 
the previous section will catch party A in any event. Where party B 
intends to benefit a trust for the children of party A it is a mistake 
for party A to instruct a solicitor to establish the trust by the 
solicitor making a small donation. By virtue of section HH 1(1), the 
solicitor drops out as a nominee, and party A, for whom the 
solicitor acted, becomes a settlor instead. This result does not save 
B from also becoming a settlor when B transfers property to the 
trust on favourable terms. 
2.4 Indirect settlements via companies and trusts 
Section HH 1 concretizes the terms of the general definition of 
“settlor” in section OB 1 to make it clear that certain transactions 
definitely qualify their authors as settlors. Section HH 1(2) 
concerns indirect settlements via companies, and section HH 1(3) 
concerns indirect settlements via trusts. The former provides that 
where a controlled foreign company10 makes a settlement or is 
deemed to do so, then any person who at the time had a “control 
interest” in the company of at least 10 per cent is a settlor. Broadly 
speaking, such people are New Zealand residents who have 10 per 
cent or more voting control of the company.11 
The same subsection, HH 1(2), deploys the meaning of 
“controlled foreign company” domestically. Where a domestic 
company would be a controlled foreign company if it were foreign, 
                                         
10 Broadly speaking, a company controlled by five or fewer New Zealand 
residents. Income Tax Act 1994 s CG 4(1). The Act attributes the income of 
such companies to their New Zealand controllers. Id subpart CG. 
11Id s CG 4(4). 
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then its settlements make people settlors if they hold what would 
amount to control interests in a foreign company. 
Section HH 1(3) operates when a trust makes a settlement. In 
those circumstances, anyone who is a settlor of the first trust is 
automatically a settlor of the second trust as well. Subsection (3) 
triggers a chain reaction so that settlors of the first trust remain 
settlors for unlimited generations of subsequent trusts. 
2.5 Acquiring of beneficial rights 
Section HH 1(4) applies to people who acquire rights to have the 
trustee of an existing trust treat them, or to treat someone else, as 
beneficiaries of the trust. In these circumstances the person 
acquiring the rights becomes a settlor, whether or not the rights are 
exercised. An example of acquisition of such rights could be the 
process of becoming a protector. Some trusts provide for 
“protectors”, who have the power to nominate beneficiaries and 
sometimes to dismiss them. 
Section HH 1(4) may be significant in respect of trusts with 
foreign settlors and/or beneficiaries. If a New Zealand-resident 
protector is appointed the effect will be to make the trust into a trust 
with a New Zealand-resident settlor. The result can be to bring the 
trust into the New Zealand tax system. 
Section HH 4(1) applies to people who acquire rights like the 
rights of protectorship in respect of existing trusts. The subsection 
does not appear to make someone who is nominated as a protector 
in a constituting trust deed into a settlor, but replacement or 
additional protectors will be settlors. Accordingly, where it is 
important to avoid trusts having a New Zealand connection New 
Zealand residents should not be appointed as replacement protectors 
or to similar positions. As a precaution, in case the view expressed 
in the second sentence of this paragraph is wrong, where it is 
important to avoid a New Zealand connection it is as well not to use 
New Zealand protectors in constituting deeds, either. 
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2.6 Limitation of definition of “settlor” 
The section OB 1 definition of “settlor” concludes with two 
provisos. First, the fact that a person is or will become a beneficiary 
does not constitute giving or receiving value. Therefore, if, for 
example, beneficiaries perform some service for a trust in return for 
a below-market fee the beneficiaries become settlors. The 
beneficiaries’ service may enhance or save the value that the 
beneficiaries qua beneficiaries will receive from the trust, but this 
return is not taken into account in computing whether the trust pays 
market value for the beneficiaries’ services. 
Secondly the definition of “settlor” does not apply in respect of 
unit trusts. The reason is that unit trusts are taxed as companies. 
Section HH 1(10) lays down a third exception, which applies to 
funds that employers may settle to provide retirement benefits for 
employees. Employers who are resident in New Zealand are 
deemed not to be settlors in respect of such settlements. This 
provision ensures that funds that employers settle for employees’ 
retirement benefits are not brought within the anti-avoidance rules 
that apply to trusts with international connections. 
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3. Income of minor beneficiaries 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2001, Parliament determined to tax income that children under 
sixteen derive from trusts at 33 per cent rather than at the individual 
rates of the children concerned. There are a number of exceptions to 
this policy, explained in this chapter. Because of the complexity of 
the legislation that relates to taxing trusts, and to cope with a 
number of consequential effects, this relatively simple policy 
change required the insertion12 into the Income Tax Act 1994 of 
what amounts to almost a small sub-code of legislation, namely 
sections HH 3A to HH 3F. Even the definition of “minor” as a child 
under sixteen is not without complexity.13 The operation of these 
sections can be best understood with some knowledge of the policy 
and history behind them. 
3.2 Policy and history 
Any income tax system that employs a progressive scale must cope 
with a tension that is very difficult to resolve. This tension is 
particularly acute where the tax unit is the individual (as is the case 
in New Zealand and in most similar countries) rather than the 
household. On one hand, tax systems generally allow individuals to 
calculate their tax independently, each applying the progressive 
scale according to personal circumstances. On the other hand law 
makers are often concerned to prevent families from reducing their 
overall tax burden by spreading the income of the primary earner 
over family members who enjoy lower rates of tax. In this context, 
trusts offer opportunities to tax planners and present problems to 
                                         
12 Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related Payments and 
Remedial Matters) Act 2001, s 20. 
13 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3F (2), see §3.6, below. 
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law makers. The reason is that the trust is particularly suited for use 
as a vehicle to spread income from high earners to low earners. 
People can easily transfer income-producing assets or businesses to 
trusts where beneficiaries are their children. The income bears tax 
at lower rates and is used to pay the children’s expenses, such as 
school fees. This position contrasts with parents who pay children’s 
expenses out of, say, their salaries, which have suffered tax at the 
maximum rate. The minor beneficiary rule is calculated to bring the 
position of the two groups of parents closer to equality. 
New Zealand’s response to income-spreading has tended to vary 
according to the political complexion of the majority in Parliament. 
In particular, Parliament has been reluctant to see income 
channelled to infants, taxed in their hands at low rates, but retained 
by trustees and ploughed back (as an investment on behalf of the 
infants) into the investments or business of the trust. Between 1968 
and 1988 this concern informed the structure of the rules for the 
taxation of trusts.14 During that time, broadly speaking the rules 
imposed a special, higher rate of tax on income that infants derived 
via fixed trusts and on income that they derived via discretionary 
trusts if the income was kept within the control of the trustee. 
Despite the intent and language of the rules there was some scope 
for people to plan their way around them.15 
New Zealand began the 1980s with relatively high rates of 
taxation, reaching 66 per cent. Towards the end of the decade the 
maximum was half that rate. There were fluctuations in the twelve 
years from 1988 to 2000, but generally speaking rates were fairly 
                                         
14 Land and Income Tax Act 1954 s 155 ff, replaced by Income Tax Act 1976 ss 
226 - 237, discussed J Prebble The taxation of trusts, Part I (1980) 25 Current 
Taxation 109-118; Part II id 134-135;  Part III id 168-178; J Prebble Taxation of 
trusts: the scope of ss 226-237 of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1976 (1981) 
11 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 195-208. 
15 J Prebble, Constitution of sub trusts to receive income of infant beneficiaries 
of discretionary trusts (1981) 9 New Zealand Universities Law Review 247-256. 
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stable. For instance, from 1990 to 1997 the rate was 24 per cent on 
incomes up to $30,875 and 33 per cent on income above that sum. 
(These rates were mitigated for people who headed low income 
families.) In effect, during the period in question New Zealand 
came close to having a flat rate tax system. The result was to 
minimise the benefits from diverting income from higher to lower 
earners. This result was reflected in 1988 when Parliament revised 
the trust taxation regime: rules to discourage income spreading 
were omitted as supererogatory. That remained the position until 
2000, when the tax scale became more progressive: 19.5 per cent up 
to $38,000, 33 per cent from $38,001 to $60,000, and 39 per cent 
over that sum. This regime offers considerably greater benefits to 
people who divert income to non-earning or low-earning children; 
hence the enactment of sections HF 3A to HF 3F. 
3.3 Basic structure of the minor beneficiary regime 
Essentially, the minor beneficiary regime divides trusts into five 
categories, which may for convenience be called: “family”, 
“independent”, “family innocent”, “mixed”, and “mixed innocent”. 
(The regime does not use the category names that are used here and 
these names over simplify the relevant factors). Nevertheless, and at 
the risk of over-simplification, the category of a trust depends 
chiefly on whether there is a family connection between any settlor 
of the trust and any beneficiaries who are minors. 
Family trusts, that is, trusts settled by people related to 
beneficiaries of the trust who are minors, are the primary target of 
the regime. Minor beneficiary income from family trusts bears tax 
at 33 per cent. Independent trusts are trusts settled by people who 
are not related to infant beneficiaries of the trusts. Family innocent 
trusts are trusts where minor beneficiaries are related to a settlor, 
but where the trust is not within the mischief that is the target of the 
legislation; that is, they are not suspected to have a significant, 
relevant purpose of income splitting. For instance, many 
Working Paper: Do Not Cite 
 
Income Taxation: The New Zealand Minor Beneficiary Regime 
Minor Benefic Working Paper 
- 20 - 
 
testamentary trusts are “family innocent”. Independent and family 
innocent trusts are not caught by the regime. 
Mixed trusts are trusts where there have been several 
settlements, some independent or family innocent, but at least one 
settlement falls within the target category of family trusts. The 
legislation provides that one or more settlements by relations have 
the effect of tainting all other settlements on the same trusts, so that 
mixed trusts fall under the regime, subject to exceptions to be 
mentioned in the next paragraph. 
Mixed innocent trusts are trusts where a tainting settlement or 
settlements of the kind just described fall below a de minimis 
threshold. Minor beneficiary income of such trusts escapes the 
regime. An example of such a settlement is a small loan to a trust 
by, say, the father of a minor beneficiary. The purpose of the loan is 
not relevant, but such a loan might occur, for instance, where a trust 
needs to meet minor expenses but all its investments are in illiquid 
forms. 
3.4 Rate of tax on income of minor beneficiaries 
The policy of section HH 3A(1)(a) appears to assume that most 
children under sixteen who derive income from trusts in fact derive 
income that would otherwise have gone to their parents. That is, the 
rule assumes that parents will have transferred income-producing 
assets to trusts, with the result of diverting income from parents to 
beneficiary children and from higher tax rates to lower tax rates. 
The assumption is that if parents had not transferred these assets 
they would have derived the income and suffered tax on it at their 
marginal rates, leaving only the net income to spend on or to give 
to the children. If most children who derive income from trusts 
have parents who earn over $60,000 a year logic might suggest that 
the appropriate rate to tax the children’s beneficiary income is the 
maximum marginal rate of 39 per cent, rather than the trustee rate 
of 33 per cent. 
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The solution just suggested would have been vulnerable to 
simple avoidance action. The reason is that the rate of tax borne by 
trustees on retained income has remained at 33 per cent. Thus, 
trustees could simply accumulate income for one year, bearing tax 
at 33 per cent, and in the following year distribute the income to a 
minor beneficiary without further impost. It follows that as far as 
the income of minor beneficiaries is concerned Parliament was 
limited to a maximum levy of 33 per cent if it was to keep within 
the overall structure of the trust taxation rules. 
The logic of the position just described might suggest that 
Parliament should simply impose tax at 33 per cent on income 
derived by minor beneficiaries that they derive via a trust, but that 
approach would not fit into the personal taxation system. The 
problem is that individual taxpayers must calculate their personal 
tax according to the progressive scale. In this calculation, no 
particular dollar is identified as bearing tax at a particular rate; only 
the total matters. Singling out a fraction of someone’s income for 
tax at a specific rate cannot be done without changing the system. 
The drafter’s response was to extract income that people derive in 
their capacity as minor beneficiaries from the rest of their income 
and to tax it separately, as if it were trustee income, at 33 per cent, 
as described in the next paragraph. 
3.5 Core rule and exemptions 
The minor beneficiary regime applies to income derived by 
“minors” as beneficiaries of trusts. For this purpose, “minors” are 
children under sixteen years of age.16 The core rule of the regime is 
section HH 3A(1)(a), which provides that if a minor derives 
beneficiary income: 
a trustee of the trust from which the beneficiary 
income is derived must pay income tax on the 
                                         
16 Income Tax Act 1994 s HF 3(2), discussed below in §3.17 
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beneficiary income as if the beneficiary income were 
trustee income 
The effect of section HH 3A(1)(a) is to tax the income in 
question at the trustee rate, currently 33 per cent, but section HH 
3A(1)(a) leaves the income still “beneficiary income” and therefore 
potentially taxable a second time, in the hands of the beneficiary, at 
the beneficiary’s personal rate. Section HH 3A(1)(b) avoids this 
problem by providing that such income “is not gross income of the 
minor”. 
One result of this structure is that in a case where the 
beneficiary’s personal marginal rate is above 33 per cent the 
beneficiary might enjoy an advantage. Such an advantage would be 
rare, considering that the 33 per cent rate on the minor beneficiary’s 
trust income applies from the first dollar. 
There is a de minimis exemption from section HH 3A(1)(a) of 
$1000 per year.17 This exemption applies per trust; so it appears to 
be possible to exploit the exemption by dividing beneficiaries’ 
income between several trusts.18 Income saved by the exemption is 
taxed at the personal rate of the beneficiary in the ordinary way. 
There are exceptions, also, for income for two particular kinds of 
trusts, namely group investment funds and trusts where the trustee 
is a Maori authority or the Maori Trustee.19 These trusts will be 
considered briefly in the proposed book. The exemption 
presumably reflects the difficulty that these trustees would face in 
determining whether beneficiaries were subject to the rule. The 
exception in respect of group investment fund income applies only 
where the income comes direct from the fund. Where, for example, 
                                         
17 Income Tax Act 1994, s HH 3B, 
18 Cf Inland Revenue Department 13 Tax Information Bulletin (2001) issue 5, 
33, where the Commissioner appears to aver that where the trust in question is 
constituted of a bank account the trustee need consider only the income of that 
account in determining whether the minor beneficiary regime applies. 
19 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3E(2). 
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a trustee of an ordinary family trust has invested in a group 
investment fund the minor beneficiary regime applies as the income 
flows through the hands of the trustee. Finally, by way of a 
compassionate exemption the minor beneficiary regime does not 
apply to income derived by a minor for whom a child disability 
allowance is paid under the Social Security Act 1964.20 
3.6 Credits and debits in trust accounts 
As has been explained, section HH 3A operates indirectly, by 
taxing minor beneficiary income “as if” it were trustee income, 
rather than directly by specifying a rate applicable to the income in 
question. A consequence is that the drafter had to add further 
provisions in order to confine this “as if” approach to the charging 
provision only. The preceding section discusses section HH 
3A(1)(b) of the Act, one of these consequential provisions. 
A second such provision is section HH 3A(2), which relates to 
the operation of trusts rather than to taxation specifically. Without 
section HH 3A(2) there might be doubt whether a trustee could 
debit minor beneficiary tax to the account of the beneficiary in 
question because the income is taxed as if it were trustee income, 
not beneficiary income. Section HH 3A(2) says that for the purpose 
of debiting and crediting accounts within trusts, income tax that the 
trustee pays on minor beneficiary income is to be treated as paid on 
behalf of the beneficiary. 
If section HH 3A(2) addressed its target explicitly, saying that 
for trust purposes minor beneficiary income is to be treated as 
income of the beneficiary, it might be a little clearer, but it is 
obvious enough that although section HH 3A(c) speaks only in 
terms of “accounts” it has in mind substantive entitlement. 
                                         
20 Id s HH 3E(1). 
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3.7 “Innocent” trusts 
Section HH 3A(1)(a) is framed in broad terms, but, broadly 
speaking it aims at inter vivos trusts established by parents, or, at 
least, funded by parents. Typically, such trusts split family incomes 
and take advantage of lower tax rates ordinarily enjoyed by non-
earning children. The exceptions to section HH 3A(1)(a) reflect this 
policy in that the exceptions apply where generally speaking this 
form of income splitting is not a significant motivation for the 
formation of the trust in question. 
As explained, section HH 3A’s policy is to limit the scope for 
high income earners to minimise tax by using settlements to divert 
income to younger members of their families. There is no policy for 
section HH 3A to apply to other settlements, that is, to settlements 
that on the face of it are innocent of the purpose of income-
spreading. Accordingly, the Act provides that such settlements are 
not subject to the minor beneficiary rule. The relevant rules are 
found partly in the definition of “settlor” in section OB 1 and partly 
in section HH 3C. The Act modifies the usual definition of 
“settlement” in section OB 1 so that certain transactions that are 
ordinarily classed as “settlements” are not settlements at all for 
purposes of sections HH 3C and HH 3D. Secondly, section HH 3C 
lists certain settlements that while remaining “settlements” escape 
section HH 3A(1). 
3.8 Modified definition of “settlement” 
The modifications to the definition of “settlement” are partly for 
taxpayer certainty and partly for taxpayer convenience. Most of the 
modifications relate to paragraph (b)(ii) the definition of “settlor” in 
section OB 1 of the Act.21 This definition of “settlor” feeds into the 
definition of “settlement”. In short, if people engage in transactions 
that make them “settlors” then the transactions are “settlements”; 
                                         
21 Id, s OB 1, definition of “settlor” para (b)(ii). 
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the two definitions share the same terminology, terminology that is 
located for drafting convenience in the definition of “settlor”. The 
result is that except that “settlor” refers to persons and that 
“settlement” refers to transactions there is no substantive difference 
between the two words as used in the Act. For this reason, the 
present discussion refers  slightly indiscriminately to definitions of 
“settlor” or “settlement” as convenient. 
To understand how the modifications to the definition work, it is 
necessary first to examine the several kinds of transaction that 
paragraph (b)(ii) mentions. First, there is lending any property, that 
is, making “any property available” at below market rates. 
Secondly, there is a subset of making property available, being “the 
provision of any financial assistance”. Next, there are four 
categories of providing financial assistance: 
q loans 
q guarantees 
q provision of security 
q provision “otherwise” 
The modifications relate only to the first three categories of “the 
provision of financial assistance”. That is, there is no modification 
in respect either of the loan of property other than money or of the 
provision of financial assistance “otherwise” than by loan, 
guarantee, or security. 
The first two modifications affect loans. First, for purposes of 
sections HH 3C and 3D, only loans existing on or after 1 April 
2002 are included in the definition of “settlement”. That is, 
although cheap loans ordinarily amount to “settlements”, for 
purposes of the modified definition all loans that were liquidated 
before 1 April 2002 may be disregarded. They are not 
“settlements”. The reason for this provision is that it is not 
uncommon for trusts to owe money to relations of beneficiaries. 
Bearing in mind that the new rules came into effect for the 2001-
2002 tax year, Parliament wished to give trusts an opportunity to 
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reorganise their affairs. Otherwise, even a small loan creates a 
“settlement” that attaches to the trust for all of its life. Secondly, 
settlements effected by loans at below market interest are caught 
only if the interest falls below the rate specified22 each year for 
determining whether an employer’s loan to an employee amounts to 
a fringe benefit for tax purposes. This provision enables lenders to 
be certain whether their loans amount to settlements. 
The third modification relates to financial assistance by the 
provision of guarantees or security in respect of a loan contracted 
by a trust. Such assistance does not render the provider a “settlor” 
so long as the guarantee or security is not called upon. 
Fourthly, although provision of services at less than market 
value ordinarily amounts to a settlement, where the services are 
incidental to the operation of the trust those services do not amount 
to a settlement, even if gratuitous. The statute gives bookkeeping, 
accounting, and acting as a trustee as examples of services that may 
be incidental to the operation of a trust. 
The 2001 amendments23 contain two limbs that mitigate the 
effect of the definition of “settlor” for purposes of the minor 
beneficiary regime. The first are the modifications to section OB 1 
itself that are discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The second 
mitigating limb was inserted as section HH 3D of the Act. Broadly 
speaking, section HH 3D provides that certain transactions that are 
settlements by virtue of the section OB 1 definition but that fall 
below specified value thresholds may be disregarded for purposes 
of deciding whether the trusts in question are thrown into the minor 
beneficiary regime. These transactions are considered in §3.15. 
                                         
22 In the Income Tax (Fringe Benefit Tax, Interest on Loans) Regulations that 
are current from time to time. 
23 Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related Payments and 
Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
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3.9 “Settlements” that are not saved 
Paragraph (a)(i)(B) of the definition of “settlor”, inserted by the 
2001 amendments, gives relief only in respect of loans that are no 
longer in existence after 1 April 2002.  As explained in the previous 
section, the relief was designed to give trusts a grace period to 
rearrange their affairs after the enactment of the minor beneficiary 
regime in 2001. 
Forms of financial assistance other than loans attract relief only 
if they amount to uncalled guarantees or unenforced securities. Any 
other financial assistance to a trust, whenever it was granted, and 
even if terminated before 2001, makes the person who provides the 
assistance a settlor. For this reason, the examples of financial 
assistance mentioned in §2.2 require re-examination. These 
examples were the provision of credit, borrowing by trustees, and 
purchase of property for trusts with delayed reimbursement. 
Paragraph (b)(ii) of the definition of “settlor” concludes its list 
of kinds of financial assistance with the word “otherwise”. It 
appears to follow that only transactions that reasonably clearly fall 
within “by way of loan, guarantee, [or] provision of security” that 
can take advantage of reliefs that relate to loans, guarantees, or the 
provision of security. There is no need to stretch the meaning of 
these words because “otherwise” capably covers the rest of the 
field. The credit element of a sale on credit to a trust and 
purchasing something for a trust on the understanding of 
reimbursement are economically equivalent to granting loans. 
Borrowing by a trustee whereby the trustee’s personal obligation 
amounts to financial assistance to the trust is economically 
equivalent to a guarantee. But the first two are not “loans” because 
no money passes from the creditor to the debtor to create the 
obligation and the second is not a “guarantee” because the trustee is 
the principal debtor, not a guarantor. These transactions, then, are 
examples of financial assistance provided “otherwise”. 
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It appears to follow that if someone sells property on credit to a 
trust in, say, 1985, (the credit being at less than market rates) even 
if the price is paid off by 1995, the provision of the credit makes 
the vendor a “settlor” of the trust for ever. The same transaction 
may make the trustees who buy the property also “settlors”, unless 
the trustees’ liability in respect of the debt is appropriately limited, 
because the trustees assist the trust financially by undertaking 
personal liability. The Commissioner takes the view that purchasing 
for cash and later obtaining reimbursement is not just economically 
equivalent to making a loan but is making a loan,24 but it is 
submitted that this is another example of financial assistance 
provided “otherwise”, which makes the purchaser a “settlor” 
indefinitely. Likewise, trustees who borrow money for a trust 
without limiting their liability would appear to be and to remain 
“settlors”. 
The 2001 amendments to the definition of “settlement”, so far as 
the amendments relate to making property available to trusts, are 
limited to cases where the transaction in question amounts to the 
provision of financial assistance. As explained in the preceding 
paragraphs, the amendments afford relief in respect of only some 
kinds of financial assistance. However, there is no relief at all in 
respect of other settlements that come about by virtue of the loan of 
property, or, in terms of the Act, by virtue of making “any property 
available” to a trust.25 Suppose, for example, that in 1995 an aunt 
lends her tractor without charge to a farming trust that includes her 
nephews among its beneficiaries; or suppose that the aunt allows 
the trust to depasture its stock on one of the aunt’s paddocks for a 
few days, again without charge. The result appears to be that there 
is a settlement by the aunt by virtue of the definition of “settlor”. 
The 2001 amendments do not relieve this transaction from being a 
                                         
24 Inland Revenue Department 13 Tax Information Bulletin (2001) issue 5, 31. 
25 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1, definition of “settlor” para (b)(ii). 
Working Paper: Do Not Cite 
 
Income Taxation: The New Zealand Minor Beneficiary Regime 
Minor Benefic Working Paper 
- 29 - 
 
settlement even though the value of the loan may have been quite 
modest. Section HH 3D(1)(c) provides a de minimis threshold for 
loans that have a total value of less than $1000 on any day of the 
trust’s income year, but in this context “loans” refers only to loans 
that amount to financial assistance. The loan of a tractor and 
making stock feed available do not seem to qualify. There is some 
irony here, in that if the aunt gave her tractor to the trust the 
transaction could potentially qualify for an alternative de minimis 
threshold, discussed in §3.14 and §3.15. 
3.10 Independent and other “innocent” settlements 
 Section HH 3C’s list of settlements that do not trigger the minor 
beneficiary regime includes settlements by parties who are not 
related to or guardians of the beneficiary or who are not associated 
with parties who are related to or guardians of the beneficiary.26 
(§3.19, below, considers the meaning in this context of “guardians”, 
“relatives” and “associated persons”.) 
On the other hand, settlements by relatives, guardians, or 
associated persons are not subject to the minor beneficiary rule if 
the settlor is:_ 
q acting on behalf of someone else,27 or 
q required by court order to pay damages or compensation to the 
minor,28 or 
q someone against whom there is a protection order under the 
Domestic Violence Act 199529 and the beneficiary in question is 
a protected person under that Act.30 
                                         
26 Id s HH 3C(1)(a). 
27 Id s HH 3C(1)(b). 
28 Id s HH 3C(1)(c). 
29 Id s HH 3C(1)(d). 
30 Id s HH 3C(2)(a). Subsections (2) and (3) of s HH 3C contain one or two 
other restrictions on this limitation. 
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3.11 Trusts established by will or on intestacy 
The general rule is that income of trusts established by will or 
otherwise as a result of the death is not subject to the minor 
beneficiary rule.31 This rule is subject to an exception, which is 
itself subject to a reverse exception. 
The exception is that minors must have been born before or 
within twelve months after the date of death in order to benefit 
from the rule.32 The exception is curious at first sight. The 
explanation appears to be that the “established by will” principle 
that takes income out of the reach of the minor beneficiary rule 
extends to trusts that are established by court variations of will 
trusts. Rich (or, at least, high income) people who are income 
beneficiaries of such trusts might find it worthwhile to promote 
court variations of will trusts to cause the trusts to skip their (and 
possibly another) generation, thus passing income on to a younger 
and poorer generation that is able to deploy its lower marginal tax 
rates. In economic substance, such a generation-skipping exercise 
could be seen as tantamount to transferring income-producing 
assets to trusts in order to spread tax liability, which is the mischief 
against which the minor beneficiary regime is targeted. 
Nevertheless, as drafted the exception does not frustrate a court 
variation to skip a generation within a testamentary trust if the new 
beneficiaries were born within 12 months of the death of the 
testator. 
By itself, the “born within 12 months” exception might appear to 
cause unfairness within families. For instance, a child alive at the 
testator’s death would not be subject to the minor beneficiary rule, 
but siblings born over a year after the death would suffer the higher 
rate of tax. Hence the reverse exception, which says that if one 
brother or sister enjoys the standard, personal rate of tax by virtue 
                                         
31 Id s HH 3C(1)(e). 
32 Id s HH 3C(1)(e)(i). 
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of timely birth, then all enjoy their personal rates rather than the 
special minor beneficiary rate.33 
3.12 M ixed trusts: trusts with several settlements 
As is apparent from these paragraphs, the minor beneficiary regime 
divides income from trusts that distribute income to minor 
beneficiaries into two categories: income that is caught by the 
regime and that is therefore taxed at 33 per cent, and income that is 
treated as ordinary beneficiary income and taxed at the personal 
rate of the beneficiary. As explained, it is broadly speaking the 
identity of the settlor that determines a trust’s category.  
It is common for trustees to receive several settlements to be 
held on the same trusts. Some such settlements may be caught by 
the regime and some may enjoy one or other of the exemptions. 
These trusts may be called “mixed trusts”. Parliament’s solution is 
to provide in section HH 3C(1) that, “section 3A does not apply to 
beneficiary income derived by a minor from a trust if all 
settlements” qualify to enjoy one or more of the exemptions. That 
is, a mixed trust falls under the minor beneficiary regime even if 
most of the corpus comes from settlements by independent parties 
and only a small part comes from settlements by relatives. 
Section HH 3C(1) does not always operate in as draconian a 
fashion as may appear at first sight. Take, for example, a will trust 
under which minor beneficiaries enjoy tax at their personal rates. 
Suppose that a relative of the beneficiaries settles funds on the same 
trust with the same trustees. It does not follow inexorably that 
income of the will trust that goes to the minor beneficiaries must be 
taxed at the special 33 per cent rate. 
The reason is that strictly speaking every settlement creates a 
new trust, even if the settlement is on the same terms and on the 
same trustees as a previous settlement. Theoretically, therefore, 
                                         
33 Id s HH 3C(1)(e)(ii), which extends to half-siblings. 
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there can be but limited  scope for section HH 3C(1) to apply, 
because if there is more than one settlement there must be more 
than one trust. 
Accordingly, so long as the trustees can keep the funds and 
income of the two settlements separate each settlement creates its 
own trust. The income of one settlement is subject to the ordinary 
rules that apply to beneficiary income, while the income of the 
other is subject to the minor beneficiary rate. Again strictly 
speaking, even if the trustees cannot keep the funds of the two trusts 
separate there remain two trusts. The problem is not whether the 
two trusts exist, but how to identify them. This situation, on the 
face of it an intermingling of funds from two trusts, does not 
necessarily involve a breach of trust because each trust has the same 
terms and same beneficiaries and, one assumes, the trustees exercise 
their discretion in the same manner in respect of both. 
The considerations in the last paragraph offer clues as to a 
sensible interpretation of section HH 3C(1). The drafter appears to 
assume that if trustees of two trusts that have been formed by 
separate settlements on the same terms allow the funds to 
intermingle there is only one trust as a matter of law. As explained, 
this assumption seems wrong, but practically speaking there would 
in this situation be only one trust to all intents and purposes. If one 
makes this assumption there is a sensible interpretation for section 
HH 3C(1), to wit: “If trustees keep funds apart they may be taxed 
separately, but if funds are mingled there is only one trust for tax 
purposes. If as a result of any settlement a part of the income of that 
trust would be subject to the minor beneficiary regime, then all of 
the income is so subject.” 
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This position is more or less confirmed by section HH 1A, 
inserted in 2001 by the same amendment that inaugurated the minor 
beneficiary regime itself.34 Section HH 1A reads: 
For the purpose of this subpart, if a settlement is made 
on a trust and further settlements are made on the 
same terms, a trustee of the trust may treat all 
settlements as one trust. 
Presumably, the trustee “may” alternatively treat each settlement 
as constituting a separate trust. If the trustee opts to treat the trusts 
as a conglomerate, and if any one of the settlements attracts the 
minor beneficiary regime in respect of the income of that 
settlement, then the regime applies to all of the income of the 
conglomerate trust that goes to minors. 
The preceding discussion has assumed that where there are two 
or more settlements on the terms of a single trust the settlements are 
conventional, such as transfers or sales of property. In such 
circumstances it is theoretically possible to keep the various trusts 
separate. In other circumstances, where a transaction creates a 
deemed settlement on an existing trust pursuant to the extended 
definition of “settlement” in section OB 135 it may be a practical 
impossibility to keep the funds of the two trusts separate. For 
example, consider a trust where the property consists of a dwelling 
and a portfolio of shares. If someone paints the dwelling free of 
charge the painter becomes a settlor by virtue of subparagraph (iii) 
of the definition of “settlor”, (provision of services for less than 
market value) but it would be impractical to calculate the fraction 
of the income of the trust that relates to this settlement. Here, there 
is “one trust” to all intents and purposes. 
                                         
34 Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related Payments and 
Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
35 See §2.2, 
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3.13 Contamination of ordinary trusts by trusts subject to the 
m inor beneficiary regime 
The combined effect of the rules described so far is that a trust that 
is outside the ambit of the minor beneficiary regime could be 
thrown into the regime by being infected, perhaps inadvertently, by 
a relatively unimportant transaction. For instance, suppose that 
there is a will trust where a number of minor beneficiaries, 
grandchildren of the testator, qualify for their beneficiary income to 
be taxed at their personal rates. Suppose that the trust is temporarily 
short of funds and suppose that a son of the testator, father to some 
beneficiaries, uncle to others, lends the trustee money on other than 
arm’s length terms. 
In these circumstances, the son is a “settlor” of the trust pursuant 
to paragraph b(ii) of the definition of “settlor” in section OB 1 of 
the Act, and has therefore made a “settlement on the trust.36 
Because the son is a relative of the minor beneficiaries the will trust 
can no longer qualify for exemption from the minor beneficiary 
regime: the problem is that not all of the trust’s settlements qualify 
for to escape from section HH 3A, as discussed in §3.7 and §3.11. 
3.14 Partial immunisation of some trusts 
Section HH 3D contains some partial remedies for the, as it were, 
overflow consequences of the minor beneficiary regime that are 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs. It begins by dividing 
settlements into those that are (a) “of the type referred to in section 
HH 3C” and (b), others, not of this type. The first group are 
settlements described earlier as “innocent”, that is, most 
testamentary settlements and other settlements that are not subject 
to the minor beneficiary regime,37 described earlier as settlements 
                                         
36 See §2.2. 
37 See §3.7 and §3.11. 
Working Paper: Do Not Cite 
 
Income Taxation: The New Zealand Minor Beneficiary Regime 
Minor Benefic Working Paper 
- 35 - 
 
that create “independent” and “family innocent” trusts.38 Type (b) 
are all others, that is, settlements where beneficiary income is 
potentially subject to the minor beneficiary tax rates. Broadly 
speaking, section HH 3D says that certain type (b) settlements of 
limited value will be treated as “innocent”. 
An example illustrates the policy of section HH 3D. Suppose 
there is a testamentary trust, say a farming trust, where the minor 
beneficiaries were alive at the death of the testator. The minor 
beneficiary regime does not apply to the income of the trust. 
Suppose that the uncle of the minor beneficiaries gives an old 
tractor, worth only two or three thousand dollars the trust. Without 
special provision, the result would be to throw the whole of the 
trust into the minor beneficiary regime. 
The modified definition of “settlement” discussed in §3.7 applies 
for purposes of the exercise described in the previous paragraph. 
That is, there is no “settlement” at all in cases where interest on a 
loan is at least at the threshold for fringe benefit tax purposes, or 
where a guarantee or security has not been called up, or where 
services supplied to a trust are only services that are ancillary to the 
trust’s operation. If these circumstances obtain, therefore, (and 
assuming that there are no other settlements that contaminate the 
trust) it is not necessary to call on section HH 3D to save the 
income of the trust from the minor beneficiary regime. 
Where it applies, the modus operandi of section HH 3D is, as it 
were, to sterilise certain type (b) settlements so that where a number 
of settlements are administered as one trust the minor beneficiary 
regime does not bite. This result obtains so long as the only 
settlements involved are type (a) settlements or sterilised type (b) 
settlements. 
                                         
38 See §3.3. 
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3.15 Below-threshold settlements 
Sterilised type (b) settlements can be of two kinds, defined by 
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of the definition of “settlor”, namely 
dispositions of property and loans or other financial assistance 
respectively, in each case being at less than market value,39 bearing 
in mind the modified definition of “settlement” that applies in the 
context of section HH 3D.40 
Each kind of settlement must remain below a ceiling value to 
take advantage of section HH 3D. For dispositions of property at 
less than market value the total allowed is $5000 in any one group 
of settlements administered as one trust. The aggregate is calculated 
at the end of the trust’s income year,41 but valuation is done as at 
the date of the settlement or settlements in question.42 That is, 
trustees are not obliged to revalue such settlements year by year. 
For loans or other financial assistance the total value of all 
settlements must be under $1000, measured on any day of the 
trust’s year.43 
As explained, section HH 3D relief is available only in respect of 
settlements that are dispositions of property or financial assistance. 
It does not give relief for settlements under subparagraphs (iii) or 
(iv) of the definition of “settlement”, by provision of services at less 
than market value or by paying too much for the receipt of trust 
property or services. That is, a subparagraph (iii) or (iv) settlement 
by a relative or associate of a minor beneficiary locks the trust into 
the minor beneficiary regime even if subparagraph (i) and (ii) 
settlements remain below their respective ceilings. 
                                         
39 See §2.2 
40 Above and see §3.7 
41 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(1)(b). 
42 Id s HH 3D(2). 
43 Id s HH 3D(1)(c). 
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3.16 Provision of services by relatives 
Section HH 3D(3) reads: 
This section does not apply if services are provided to 
a trust by a relative of a legal guardian of a minor or 
by a person associated with the relative or the legal 
guardian. 
The effect of subsection (3) is to deny the benefits of subsection 
(1) to trusts where relatives provide services whether or not the 
services are remunerated at market rates. Its operation is best 
explained by reference to an example. Suppose the godfather of a 
minor (that is, a non-relative) settles property on trust for the 
benefit of the minor. Income from the trust is not subject to the 
minor beneficiary regime because the settlement was made by a 
person who is neither a relative nor a legal guardian of the minor.44 
The result is the same if the godfather first settles a nominal sum in 
order to create the trust and follows the nominal settlement with the 
major settlement that is proposed, or it the godfather procures his 
solicitor to effect the nominal settlement. 
If the minor’s father then works for the trust (that is, provides 
services to it, in terms of subsection (3)) income from the trust 
remains outside the minor beneficiary regime because the provision 
of fully remunerated services is not a “settlement”. 
Suppose, however, that before the godfather makes his 
settlement the father helpfully establishes the trust with a nominal 
donation. On the assumption that the father is acting on his own 
account and not as nominee of the godfather, this nominal donation 
makes the father a settlor by virtue of paragraph (b)(i) of the 
definition of “settlor”. The father is also a “settlor” if he procures 
his solicitor to make the nominal settlement, by virtue of section 
HH 1(1).45 The result is that the trust is a mixed trust and is subject 
                                         
44 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3C(1)(a), see §3.10. 
45 See §2.3. 
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to the minor beneficiary regime unless it is saved by section HH 
3D(1). In fact, it probably is saved, assuming that the father’s 
nominal settlement is valued at less than $5000, as explained in 
§3.15. 
Suppose, however, that the father works for the trust for full 
remuneration. The father’s work triggers subsection (3), being the 
provision of services by a relative. In turn, subsection (3) withdraws 
the comfort of section HH 3D(1), with the result that the father’s 
nominal settlement taints the whole trust. 
This result is curious when compared with the case where the 
godfather is responsible for both the nominal and the substantive 
settlement. In that case, the father’s fully remunerated services have 
no effect on the tax status of the trust. In contrast, these fully 
remunerated services trigger the consequences of the father’s 
nominal initial settlement, those consequences being the bite of the 
minor beneficiary regime. 
The example just discussed reveals that the policy of the 
legislation is not that relatives’ provision of fully remunerated 
services should trigger the minor beneficiary regime. It is only 
when such provision occurs in the context of a trust where a relative 
has made some other settlement (but a settlement of a non-material 
amount) that the regime comes into play. 
For completeness, note that subsection (3) is not relevant where 
a relative provides services that are remunerated at less than market 
rates, or where a relative makes a disposition of property or a loan 
to a trust (apart from dispositions or loans below the threshold 
values). In such circumstances, if the godfather or any other non-
relative is rash enough to make a disposition to the trust the income 
from the disposition will be caught along with any income that 
arises from the other settlements just mentioned. That is, the trust in 
question is a mixed trust that section HH1 3D(1) cannot save. 
The result seems to be that section HH 3D(3) will operate 
principally where people have made a mistake. For instance, if the 
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godfather makes all the settlements on the trust in question, 
expecting that the father will work for the trust, the minor 
beneficiary regime does not apply. But if circumstances are 
changed by having the father helpfully establish the trust himself, 
then the regime will apply. 
This arbitrary-looking regime is mitigated in some circumstances 
by section HH 3D(4), which reads: 
In subsection (3), services do not include services that 
are incidental to the operation of the trust, such as 
bookkeeping or accounting services or those provided 
in being a trustee. 
That is, if the father’s only services to the trustee are as trustee 
or bookkeeper or accountant, even if unremunerated, subsection (3) 
remains dormant. Accordingly, continuing the example that has 
been discussed, in the event that the father creates the godfather’s 
trust with an initial nominal settlement that nominal settlement is 
saved by section HH 3D(1)(a)(i) and income from the godfather’s 
settlement remains outside the minor beneficiary regime (on the 
assumption that there are no other tainting settlements in play). 
3.17 Examples of “settlement” transactions 
§3.8 explains that the legislation contains two limbs that mitigate 
the effect of the definition of “settlor” and “settlement” for the 
purposes of the minor beneficiary regime. The first limb, discussed 
in §3.8, comprises modifications to the definitions in section OB 1 
of the Act. The second limb comprises section HH 3D’s 
dispositions in respect of below-threshold settlements, discussed 
above. Some examples may illustrate the intersecting effect of the 
two limbs. 
Suppose an aunt is disposed to confer a benefit on a trust where 
the beneficiaries include her under sixteen-year-old nephews. 
Suppose that the bulk of the corpus of the trust comes from a 
testamentary settlement and that all minor beneficiaries were alive 
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at the death of the testator. That is, fundamentally the trust is one 
that should be outside the minor beneficiary regime. The following 
transactions are all “settlements” according to the unmodified 
definition of the term. They would therefore throw the trust into the 
minor beneficiary regime unless they are saved by one or other of 
the two limbs. Some are saved by the section OB 1 modifications 
and some by section HH 3D, and some are not saved. The examples 
are: 
q Aunt guarantees or provides security for a loan. The transaction 
is saved by the modifications to the definition unless the 
guarantee or the security is called up.46 
q Aunt lends $20,000 in 1998 that is refinanced by a bank loan in 
February 2002. The transaction is similarly saved because the 
aunt’s loan did not exist on or after 1 April 2002.47  
q Aunt lends $500 in 2002. The transaction is saved by section 
HH 3D(1)(c), assuming there are no other loans that bring the 
total above the $1000 threshold. 
q Aunt lends $50,000 in 2002 at interest that is pegged to the 
fringe benefit tax rate. The transaction is not a “settlement” 
because the 2001 modifications to the definition of “settlor” 
mean that such a loan is not “for less than market value”.48 
q The trust runs a farm. Aunt lends her tractor gratuitously from 
time to time. The transaction is caught by the definition of 
“settlor”. It is not saved by any modification of the definition 
because the modifications apply only to the provision of 
                                         
46 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(ii), inserted by s 
39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related 
Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
47 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(i)(B), inserted by 
s 39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related 
Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
48 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(i)(A), inserted by 
s 39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related 
Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
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financial assistance, not to lending property “for less than 
market value”.49 Even if the values of the loans of the tractor 
are minimal, section HH 3D(1) does not save the transaction. 
The reason is that section HH 3D’s $5000 threshold applies 
only to dispositions of property, not to loans,50 and the $1000 
threshold applies only to loans of money or the provision of 
other financial assistance.51 
q The trust runs a farm. Aunt is a neighbour. She sells a paddock 
to the trust on credit, with price payable on demand (which is 
deferred) and interest payable at fringe benefit tax rates if 
demanded. The granting of credit is a “settlement”, being 
financial assistance provided “otherwise” than by loan, 
guarantee or security and involving an on-demand obligation 
that is deferred.52 None of the modifications to the definition of 
“settlor” refers to financial assistance provided “otherwise” and 
the possibly relevant section HH 3D(1) threshold applies only to 
loans. The result is that the pegging of the interest rate to the 
fringe benefit tax rate is of no avail to the beneficiaries.53 The 
minor beneficiary regime applies. It does not matter how long 
ago the sale occurred or whether the price left owing was 
liquidated before 1 April 2002.54 
                                         
49 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (b)(ii), 
50 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(1)(a)(i) and (b). 
51 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(1)(a)(ii) and (c). 
52 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (b)(ii), 
53 Pace Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(i)(A), 
inserted by s 39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-
Related Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
54 Pace Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(i)(B), 
inserted by s 39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-
Related Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
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q Aunt acts as trustee gratuitously. The transaction is saved by a 
modification to the definition, “settlor by provision of 
services”.55 
q Uncle, aunt’s husband, donates $4000. The transaction is saved 
by section HH 3D(1)(c), assuming there are no other donations 
that bring the total above the $5000 threshold. 
q Combining the last two examples, uncle donates $4000 and aunt 
acts as trustee gratuitously. Uncle’s donation is a settlement, 
and must rely on section HH 3D(1)(c), but by virtue of the 
modification of the definition aunt’s services are not a 
settlement.56 Nevertheless, as “provision of services” aunt’s 
trusteeship potentially disqualifies uncle’s donation from taking 
advantage of the section HH 3D(1)(b) threshold of $5000. By 
reverse exception aunt’s trusteeship does not disqualify uncle’s 
donation because in this context “services” does not include 
service as a trustee.57 
q Altering the last example, uncle donates $4000 and aunt 
arranges for the trustee to invest in a fund that aunt manages. 
Aunt charges fees at full market rates. Again, uncle’s donation 
is a settlement, and must rely on section HH 3D(1)(c). By virtue 
of the unmodified definition aunt’s services are not a 
settlement.58 Nevertheless, as “provision of services” aunt’s 
fund management disqualifies uncle’s donation from taking 
advantage of the section HH 3D(1)(b) threshold of $5000.59 The 
combination of uncle’s and aunt’s transactions throws the trust 
                                         
55 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (a)(iii), inserted by s 
39(13) of the Taxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, Services-Related 
Payments and Remedial Matters) Act 2001. 
56 Idem. 
57 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(4). 
58 By inference from Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para 
(b)(iii), which applies only where services are provided “for less than market 
value”. 
59 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(3). 
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into the minor beneficiary regime. This result is hard to 
reconcile with the policy of the Act in that uncle’s donation is 
below the $5000 threshold and aunt charges full fees for 
services that she provides. Nevertheless, the regime certainly 
bites.60 
q Slightly modifying the last example, uncle donates $4000 
and aunt arranges for the trustee to invest in a fund that 
aunt manages. In this modification, aunt waives her fees. 
Uncle’s donation remains a settlement, and must rely on 
section HH 3D(1)(c). Aunt’s services are also a settlement 
because they are gratuitous.61 Neither the 2001 
modifications nor section HH 3D saves the aunt’s 
transaction. Accordingly, aunt’s settlement brings the trust 
under the regime. Moreover, as a “provision of services” 
aunt’s fund management disqualifies uncle’s donation 
from taking advantage of the section HH 3D(1)(b) 
threshold of $5000.62 The result is that in this example 
each of uncle’s and aunt’s transactions independently 
throws the trust into the minor beneficiary regime. 
3.18 “Minors” 
For the purposes of sections HH 3A to HH 3F (but not for other 
purposes) a “minor” is a child who is a New Zealand resident and 
who is under sixteen years of age on the balance date of the trust 
that makes a relevant distribution of beneficiary income to the 
minor. Confining the regime to New Zealand residents and 
allowing non-resident minor beneficiaries to enjoy their personal 
tax rates is at first sight curious. Considering that the regime is 
                                         
60 See a similar example, with a similar result, in Inland Revenue Department 
13 Tax Information Bulletin (2001) issue 5, 34 (example 4). 
61 Income Tax Act 1994 s OB 1 definition of “settlor” para (b)(iii), provision of 
services “for less than market value”. 
62 Income Tax Act 1994 s HH 3D(3). 
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essentially an anti-spreading measure one would have thought that 
spreading to non-resident beneficiaries would be an equal mischief 
to spreading to resident beneficiaries, though of course there are 
many more of the latter. The reason may relate to a wish to 
minimise compliance work on the part of trustees, who no doubt 
find it easier to keep track of the birthdays of residents than of those 
of non-residents. 
3.19 M inors and “balance date” 
As to the choice of date as the marker for age measurement, the Act 
does not contain a definition of “balance date” that applies for 
general purposes, though clause 2 of Schedule 13 Part A defines 
“balance date” for purposes of that Part. Part A relates to dates for 
the payment of provisional tax, that is, advance payments of tax on 
business profits and other income that is not subject to withholding 
at source. The definition is: 
“balance date” in relation to income tax payable by a 
taxpayer in an income year or other period, means the 
date of the annual balance of the taxpayer’s accounts 
for that year or other period, being a year or other 
period for which the taxpayer is required by this Act 
or the Tax Administration Act 1994 to furnish a return 
of income. 
That is, for purposes of Schedule 13 Part A, “balance date” means 
what one would expect, the last date of a taxpayer’s financial year, 
being the date up to which taxpayers make up their accounts for 
both profit reporting and tax purposes. This also is the meaning 
employed in the Tax Administration Act 1994.63 
No doubt, the Commissioner would expect the same meaning to 
obtain in respect of sections HH 3F(2). Nevertheless, there is an 
argument that trustees could, if they wished, change what they call 
                                         
63 Tax Administration Act 1994, ss 38 and 119. 
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their “balance date” to a date that would yield maximum advantage 
to beneficiaries who are about to celebrate their sixteenth birthdays. 
No doubt, trustees could not simply label a date after a sixteenth 
birthday as “balance date” without more, but trustees who made 
accounts up to that date could reasonably argue that it was their 
balance date. Such a course would not necessarily mean changing 
the times of payment of provisional tax, nor would it mean 
changing the date to which the trust makes up its accounts for tax 
purposes. Nevertheless, the compliance costs involved would make 
the exercise worthwhile only rarely. 
3.20 “Guardians”, “relatives” and “associated persons” 
§3.7 explains that certain settlements on trusts with minor 
beneficiaries are exempt from the minor beneficiary regime because 
they are not caught by the policy of the regime. To summarise, 
settlements by non-relatives qualify for the exemption because they 
do not entail the kind of income splitting that is the target of the 
regime. Further, settlements in relation to damages payments or 
protection orders in respect of domestic violence are outside the 
scope of the regime, even if made by relatives of relevant minor 
beneficiaries. To achieve these policies while avoiding the creation 
of loopholes the drafter had to define “relative” and to provide for 
settlements by people who might stand in the position of relatives, 
such as guardians and people associated with relatives. The relevant 
definitions are in section HH 3 F. Section HH 3F(3) reads: 
In sections HH 3A and HH 3D, relative, in relation to 
a person (person A), means another person (person B) 
connected with person A by blood relationship, 
marriage, or adoption and includes the trustee of a 
trust under which person B has benefited or is eligible 
to benefit. 
Section HH 3F(4)(a) expands this definition to explain that relevant 
blood relationships are those up to and including the fourth degree. 
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Section HH 3F(4)(b) and (c) apply the rules in respect of 
relationship by marriage and adoption. Curiously, section HH 
3F(4)(d) provides that “In subsection (3) … persons are connected 
by guardianship if one is a guardian of the other”. The curiosity is 
that in defining “relative”, section HH 3F(3) extends relevant 
connections to marriage and adoption, but not to guardianship. The 
result is that section HH 3F(4)(d) is a brutum fulmen. 
There is even greater curiosity when words relating to 
relationships by blood, marriage, and adoption are excised from 
section HH 3F(3). Then, in respect of trusts, the rule reads, “… 
relative, in relation to a person (person A) means another person 
(person B) and includes the trustee of a trust under which person B 
… is eligible to benefit.” The problem is that to be person A one 
does not need any connection with anyone. Literally, it would seem 
that anyone who is a beneficiary of a trust (person B) is a relative of 
anyone else (person A), which cannot be correct. It is possible that 
Parliament intended to say that trustees shall be treated as if they 
were relatives of their beneficiaries, but this explanation seems 
hardly more plausible.  
As to “guardian”, section HH 3F(1) follows the definition in 
section 3 of the Guardianship Act 1968. In broad terms, a 
“guardian” under this definition is someone with rights and duties 
similar to those of a parent. The minor beneficiary regime treats 
such a guardian in the same manner as it treats relatives. That is, 
settlements by such guardians generally do not qualify for 
exemption from the regime. 
A number of statutes use “guardian” in senses that are different 
from that described in the preceding paragraph. For example, 
section 110 of the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 
1989 contains several references to guardians appointed for children 
in the interests of their care or protection. Section HH 3C(1) 
provides that such “guardians” are not guardians as section HH 
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3C(1) uses the word. The result is that settlements by such people 
are treated as being by independent persons. 
In exempting settlements by strangers from the minor 
beneficiary regime,64 section HH 3C in general withholds the 
benefit of the exemption from settlements by relatives or legal 
guardians or by persons associated with a relative or legal guardian 
of the minor in question. The regime does not have its own 
definition of “associated person” for this purpose. Instead, it relies 
on the general tests in section OD 7, which defines when two 
persons are associated with one another. Under section OD 1 a 
partner and any member of the partnership are “associated”, as are a 
company and anyone who controls 25 per cent of the company. 
Where two people are associated and one of them is a nominee of 
someone else, then the nominee’s associated status affects the 
principal. Section OD 1 contains further provisions that, broadly 
speaking, cause it to operate where associated person status can be 
descried indirectly rather than directly. 
                                         
64 See §3.7. 
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4. Beneficiaries and the imputation system for companies 
4.1 Introduction 
New Zealand operates a full imputation system for the taxation of 
companies and shareholders. Section ME 6 of the Income Tax Act 
1994 empowers companies to attach tax credits to dividends that 
they pay to shareholders. Section LB 2 allows shareholders to use 
these credits to offset income tax liability on the dividend and on 
other income if there is a surplus credit. 
The Act takes it for granted that trustees pass the benefit of 
imputation credits on to beneficiaries along with beneficiary 
income that flows through the trust to beneficiaries, and passes 
straight to the issue of how imputation credits must be apportioned 
when trustees’ income from mixed sources flows through to 
beneficiaries. 
4.2 Apportionment of imputation credits 
Section LB 1(1) requires that imputation credits that flow through a 
trust to beneficiaries must be apportioned according to a formula set 
out in section LB 1 (3). The effect of the formula is to spread the 
benefit of imputation credits evenly over all distributions to 
beneficiaries in a particular year. To illustrate, suppose that trustees 
distribute to beneficiaries a sum that in aggregate is made up partly 
of dividends that enjoy imputation credits and partly of, say, current 
year business profits, partly of business profits accumulated from 
earlier years, and partly of original trust capital. The trustees may 
determine by resolution that, for example, beneficiary A, a New 
Zealand resident, shall have all the dividends, and that the 
distributions to beneficiaries B and C come from the other sources 
mentioned. One reason for favouring A in this manner could be that 
beneficiary B is a tax exempt charity and beneficiary C is a non-
resident who is unable to make use of New Zealand imputation 
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credits in her home country. Section LB 1 (3) frustrates this 
strategy by deeming A, B, and C to share the dividends, and 
consequently the imputation credits, in proportion to their 
respective shares of the trustee’s distributions for the year. This 
apportionment rule applies in the same manner whether credits 
reach beneficiaries by virtue of the terms of fixed trusts or pursuant 
to the decision of a trustee of a discretionary trust. 
This apportionment rule is subject to section HH 6, which deems 
trust distributions to be made from different sources in the 
following order: current year income; income from past years; 
current year capital profits; capital profits from past years; and, 
finally, trust corpus. 
4.3 Apportionment when the minor beneficiary regime applies 
Chapter 3 describes the minor beneficiary regime, which causes 
most income derived by minor beneficiaries to be taxed as if it were 
trustee income and not as beneficiary income, as explained in §3.5. 
This treatment poses problems for apportionment of income 
between beneficiaries. For instance, how does one allocate benefits 
such as imputation credits when some income that belongs to a 
beneficiary is treated for some purposes as belonging to the trustee? 
The Act addresses some of these possible problems. 
For apportionment purposes, the potential difficulty with 
imputation credits and dividend withholding payment credits is that 
section HH 3A(1)(b) says that income caught by the minor 
beneficiary rule “is not gross income of the minor”.65 Without 
more, it would follow that the minor in question could not take the 
benefit of an imputation credit attached to a dividend that for trust 
law purposes flowed to the minor via the trust. The Act’s remedy is 
to say that in these circumstances section HH 3A(1)(b) does not 
apply66 and that the apportionment formula described in §4.2 
                                         
65 See §3.5. 
66 Income Tax Act 1994 s LB 1(1)(ab). 
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operates normally. That is, the minor beneficiary income in 
question goes into the calculation as income derived via the trust by 
the relevant beneficiary in the relevant tax year. 
Once a credit is calculated as described, the trustee, not the 
beneficiary, takes the benefit of the credit and sets the credit against 
liability for tax on trustee income.67 This process makes sense 
because it is the trustee that has paid the tax on income subject to 
the minor beneficiary regime. 
There are no statutory provisions other than those just described 
for dealing with apportionment problems that may arise in other 
contexts when there is minor beneficiary income that is taxed to the 
trustee. Since such income is not gross income of the beneficiary it 
appears that benefits such as foreign tax credits that may be 
attached to the income must be taken within the trust, and cannot be 
passed on to minor beneficiaries. 
 
                                         
67 Income Tax Act 1994 s LB 1A. 
